The Current State of South Korean Civil Society under Lee Myung-bak

By Sandy Yu

I. INTRODUCTION

The civil society movements of 2008 reinvigorated and reawakened a deep sense of purpose and political awareness in South Korea, reminiscent of the democratic struggles in the 1980s. After ten years of progressive rule under Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, relations with the nascent Lee Myung-bak administration are tenuous at best. Civil society members who had grown accustomed to special privileges and direct interactions with the government no longer have these advantages. However, in the tremors resonating from month-long beef protests as well as the insubordinate will of the activists involved in the North Korea balloon campaign, civil society organizations have proven that they will not be silenced. They have become an undeniable presence within South Korean democracy.

This paper will first delve into the development of civil society organizations in South Korea and the challenges they currently face. Next, it examines government responses towards the beef protests and the North Korean human rights balloon campaign, discerning from that variance, the current status of civil society organizations under the Lee Myung-bak administration. From this, the paper examines how the beef protests mirror the status of U.S.-Korea relations and how the North Korean human rights balloon campaign has adversely impacted inter-Korean affairs in 2008. Finally, it takes a look at the future prospects for civil
society organizations in South Korea.

II. GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society has transformed drastically from the days under the dictatorial rule of President Chun Doo-hwan. On June 10, 1987, students and labor unions formed the bulwark of the uprising against military dictatorship. The people’s desires for direct presidential elections were heard. Following this, the June 29 Declaration legalized the right to vote and the reign of military leaders in South Korea came to an end. After the volatility of military rule ceased, the once antagonistic relationship between state and society evolved into one of cooperation.

Under the civilian leadership of President Kim Young-sam, who openly embraced reform, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) flourished. An article by Katharine Moon entitled South Korean Civil Society, states that around 74.2 percent of all CSOs were established from 1993-1998. The government also began to financially support NGOs, seriously consider their policy proposals and even enact some of their recommendations into law. This pattern continued under the watch of Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun to the extent that NGOs and CSOs came to be known as the “fourth branch of the government.” Under the banner of “participatory government,” the new position of “secretary to the president for civil society” was created, which ensured proper communication between NGOs and the ROK government. Additionally, various CSO leaders were recruited into government agencies.

However, under the newly elected Lee Myung-bak administration, many of the commissions that had facilitated communication between government officials and civil society leaders under Roh Moo-hyun were abolished and no new conduit for communication was established. With no formal channels of communication between the government and civil society, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Song Min-soon, characterized as a shift from a “broad and deep” relationship under President Roh to a “nominal” relationship under President Lee. In addition to the issue of decreased communication with the government, civil society was dealing with structural issues at the start of 2008 that hastened their decline.
III. CHALLENGES FACED BY CIVIL SOCIETY

Despite the exponential growth of civil society in the 1990s, Korean civil society in the post-Roh years has been dwindling in popular support. A 2005 survey by the *JoongAng Daily* revealed that the credibility ranking of NGOs in Korea against NGOs in other countries dropped from first to fifth since 2003. In 2007, a series of exploratory articles by the *Korea Herald* analyzed the challenges of South Korean civil society and identified several factors as having contributed to the constriction of CSO and NGO influence.

First, the need for financial support poses serious challenges for civic groups to maintain neutrality. Many organizations survive through contributions from private corporations and government organizations. However David Steinberg, distinguished professor and director of Asian Studies at Georgetown University points out, “In a Confucian-influenced society, such as Korea, in which hierarchy is vitally important in administrative as well as personal relationships, the influence of the state may be more profound than, for example, in the United States.” With amorphous lines between state and society, it becomes increasingly difficult to trust the intentions of civil society organizations.

Second, conservative and progressive civil society groups remain staunchly divided in their outlook concerning the North Korea issue and U.S.-ROK relations. Lee Seon-mi at the Third Sector Institute asserts that the problem is not so much different ideologies at play as it is that CSOs are too rigid in their ideological beliefs. Lee cites communication between different ideological groups as a necessary component of a sound civil society. The polarization between the two groups has been further exacerbated by differing political camps.

Finally, although the traditional spirit of social movements in the 1980s was based on student activism, many organizations now fail to reflect the desires of the public. Instead, the organizations are fueled by the ideals of its leaders and staff members. As Park Sun-young of *Hankook Ilbo’s* International Affairs Desk explains in her article, “Shinsedae,” “Korean civic movements have fallen into parochialism reflecting the interests of comparatively fewer people. It shows a limited capacity to brace for dynamic demands erupting from Korean society.”
IV. THE INTERNET AS THE NEW PUBLIC SPHERE

South Korea is characterized as an information society, adopting a new lexicon of technical jargon such as “group think,” “madcowmob,” and “2MB.” In 2008, civil movements were emboldened by the internet and were able to grow into such large scale movements due to the new era of broadband diplomacy led by “netizens,” or internet citizens. Before taking to the streets, these netizens were able to voice their discontent and collaborate with others online, thus broadening their support base.

In the article, “Online Civic Participation,” published in Media, Culture, and Society, Chang Yoo-young identifies geography, government policy, economy and culture as the four main reasons South Korea has become an information society. First, in a densely populated metropolitan area like Seoul, the internet has become an economical method of connecting with one another. Second, the government has also actively pursued policies that nurture the development of information technology. Third, internet use has become greatly affordable at the equivalent of $25 a month. Finally, for a country traditionally bound by Confucian ideals, the internet has become a way to escape solidified hierarchy and for younger citizens to freely express themselves. Chang follows up his argument by stating, “It is only natural that reform-oriented netizens would actively use online means to disseminate their own versions of public opinions and to participate in social movements.”

In a country where media is dominated by conservative voices, the internet has also emerged as an alternate method for promoting public discussion and representing a wider spectrum of opinions. Online media has formed a new grassroots medium for those previously excluded from voicing their opinions. In a June 12, 2008 Korea Times article, former President Kim Dae-jung observed, “We are experiencing an extraordinary phenomenon in Korea. We are witnessing the practice of direct democracy for the first time since it was exercised in Athens 2,000 years ago. [It] is practiced via the internet and text messages, and candlelight vigils on the streets.” Kim’s statement reflects the key role played by the internet in rallying and organizing supporters during the 2008 candlelight vigils.
V. 2008 CANDLELIGHT VIGILS: THE BEEF PROTEST

On April 18, 2008, the Lee Myung-bak administration agreed to reopen the Korean market for U.S. beef. U.S. beef imports had been banned in Korea after the 2003 outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), more commonly referred to as “mad cow disease,” in the United States. The decision to lift this ban was surreptitiously placed in the June 25 government gazette without forewarning or prior explanation to the public. Issued on the eve of a summit meeting between President Lee and President Bush, the agreement was meant to facilitate the passage of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA).

After the announcement, MBC’s PD Notebook program aired an episode, “Is U.S. Beef Safe?” The program falsely claimed that South Koreans were especially susceptible to mad cow disease, spurring panic throughout the Korean public. As rumors began to spread that school cafeterias were a designated target for U.S. beef, many school children and parents began to voice their apprehension through internet forums and discussion boards. Thirteen-year-old Cha Yoon-min told the Washington Post, “I am afraid of American beef. I could study hard in school. I could get a good job, and then I could eat beef and just die.” Starting from May 2, distraught parents and teenagers began organizing small scale candlelight vigils in protest. Meanwhile, the People’s Conference against Mad Cow Disease was formed by concerned netizens and on May 6 the group facilitated forums for public discussion about the dangers of U.S. beef. It wasn’t until May 26 that hundreds of thousands of South Koreans began to protest in earnest. The internet, operating as a newfound channel for the public to voice their concerns, was used to gather together hundreds of thousands of South Koreans for the 2008 candlelight vigils.

By allowing U.S. beef back into the country, President Lee removed a major obstacle to garnering U.S. congressional approval of a free trade agreement that could potentially increase South Korea-U.S. trade by $20 billion a year. To Lee, a seasoned businessman, the justification for allowing U.S. beef back into the market seemed almost self-evident. However, his seemingly harmless decision backfired and the beef issue exploded into a grassroots political movement against the Lee administration.
According to Park Jung-eun of the South Korean NGO, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, over 18,000 CSOs rallied together around the dangers of U.S. beef because they saw this as a cause that the people wanted to fight for. As a result, an estimated 100,000 protestors took to the streets, eventually crippling President Lee’s nascent government. As a result, Lee was forced to drastically reshuffle his cabinet. He also conceded to public demands and banned U.S. beef from cattle older than thirty months, thus playing into the belief that cattle younger than thirty months carry less risk of BSE.

However, the fear of BSE was not the only issue driving the protests. The 2008 candlelight vigils were also motivated by a number of broader underlying issues. First and foremost, many protestors saw in President Lee’s policies a desire to cater to U.S. policies to the detriment of South Korea, signifying an uneven balance in U.S.-Korea relations. Underpinning this dissatisfaction was a sense that the United States was getting the upper hand in U.S.-ROK relations. Protestors demanded equal treatment from the United States. One protestor, thirty-four year old Hwang Jung-sun, explained, “It’s not that I don’t like America. It’s the way Bush throws around his weight. He’s not treating South Korea as an ally but as a vassal state. I don’t want to accept everything just because the Americans are making demands, like asking to dispatch South Korean soldiers to wars that he created and eat the beef when safety is in question.”

Although the issue of inequality in U.S.-ROK relations was a key motivation for the protests, the candlelight vigils also reflected dissatisfaction with the Lee administration’s domestic policies in general. From the start of his administration, the Lee government appointed officials based on past affiliations, such as colleagues from Korea University, Somang Presbyterian Church, and Yongnam Province. In an interview with the Christian Science Monitor, Korean school teacher Kim Haeng-su, stated, “Thousands of students are here to protest his educational policy. The students say they have no voice in the system, and he only cares about education for the rich people.” Many protestors also scoffed at Lee’s “cronyism” and his inability to incorporate others, and many young people felt that Lee’s cronyism only perpetuated the pressure-cooker conditions they endured at school.

Other major groups represented were the progressive leftist labor groups and minority party leaders. During the 2007 election period, many of the internet
media groups that swept progressive leaders like Roh Moo-hyun into power were staunchly suppressed. Lee Han-ki, editor-in-chief of the internet news source, OhMyNews, stated, “In 2007, we didn’t have the right to give our opinion on public forums or websites, only private blogs. It was officially forbidden to voice support for one candidate. People who wrote such articles were arrested by the police and this stopped people from voicing their opinions on the Internet.” It is quite probable that the intensity of the protests was magnified because many of the stronger progressive voices had been stifled by the government.

The tumultuous aftermath of the 2008 vigils calls for increased communication between the South Korean government and civil society. For example, by properly informing its citizens of its decision to import U.S. beef and remaining transparent, the government could have better gauged the response of its citizens. Giving CSOs the power to voice their concerns through commissions and government posts would have also provided information about citizens’ opinions, which was the case, however small of scale, during the Roh administration.

VI. NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS BALLOON CAMPAIGN

Another significant civil society movement in 2008 was the resurgence of the North Korean human rights balloon campaign, also referred to as the “gospel gas balloons.” Started in 2005 by Christian missionary groups and North Korean defectors against the Kim Jong-il regime, the program sent balloons filled with Bible scriptures and nylon stockings - using the stockings as a lure to entice North Koreans to pick the balloons up - across the border into North Korea. Unlike the more progressive groups leading the beef protests, the balloon campaigns were mainly engineered by conservative groups such as Fighters for Free North Korea and Family Assembly Abducted to North Korea.

The tactics utilized by these conservative groups were religious in nature. A California-based Korean American missionary, Douglas Shin, stated in a China Post interview on August 16, 2005, “Christians have become the alpha and omega of the North Korean issue. We have picked up this banner to help the North Korean people. Some people don’t like using the word crusade, but that’s exactly
what this is - a crusade to liberate North Korea.” Conservative NGOs tended to advocate the hardline policies of the Bush administration in dealings with North Korea. With estimated figures of 150,000 to 200,000 North Koreans held in detention camps and with the death penalty for those possessing Bibles, many of these Christian organizations focused on human rights violations within North Korea.

In early September 2008, balloons were released, this time not carrying Bible verses, but carrying messages proclaiming the failing health of their leader, Kim Jong-il. BBC news quoted a leaflet that read, “My fellow North Koreans! Do not just sit and die of hunger but fight against Kim Jong-il!” Another stated, “Your ‘great’ leader’s last days are approaching. The dictator has collapsed from illness.” Because they question the stability of Kim Jong-il’s rule, the dissemination of these pamphlets has been particularly sensitive.

At a crucial time in inter-Korean relations, the campaign had negative repercussions on the rapidly deteriorating North-South relationship. However, for many activists, the chief motivation was not to nurture North-South relations, but rather to relay the message of freedom to their North Korean brethren. Park Sang-hak, a human rights activist and former defector, felt compelled to reach out to those he left behind. In an interview with the Korea Times on November 25, 2008, Park stated, “North Korea is a feudal dictatorship hidden behind an iron curtain. We’re sending these flyers across the border to let the people in the North know about the concept of freedom, and to provide factual information about their leader.”

On October 2, 2008, North and South Korean military leaders met in Panmunjom to discuss methods of improving military communication between the two countries. The meetings were historic in that they were only the second official round of talks between North and South Korean officials since Lee took office in February. At the outset, the purpose of the meeting was to ask the South Korean government to improve communication systems by replacing copper cables with fiber-optic cables. However, the officials used equal time to condemn the leaflet distribution by the South. Unlike the summit meeting held between Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Jong-il exactly a year before on October 2-4, 2007 in which they agreed to continue towards peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula through the “Declaration for the Development of North-South Relations and Peace and
Prosperity,” this 2008 military meeting carried a drastically antagonistic tone.

North Korean military officials pointed to an agreement made during the June 2004 talks in which both sides agreed to cease propaganda distribution in the form of broadcasts, bulletins, and leaflets. For the breach of conduct, the North demanded apologies, punishment of those responsible, and a promise to prevent future occurrences. North Korea threatened that if these conditions were not met, it would expel South Koreans working at the joint industrial zone, the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The North Koreans also stated that tours through the border city of Kaesong, cross-border railway services between Munsan and Kaesong would be suspended, and the number of permanent South Korean employees at the Kaesong Industrial Complex would be cut in half. The office for inter-Korean economic cooperation would also be closed, and the South Korean officials working there would be asked to leave. South Korean organizations, such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex management committee, an association of South Korean companies within the industrial park, Hyundai Asan, Kaesong tour operators, and the South Korean chief delegate to military level talks were officially notified of North Korea’s intentions.

The significance of North Korea’s threat was that it signaled the deterioration of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, a symbol of the exchange and cooperation built through Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy. North Korea’s response endangered the viability of the industrial park in total, and the ramifications of North Korea’s actions would negatively affect not only cross-border relations but future Six-Party Talks as well as North Korea - U.S. ties.

At this juncture, North Korea seemed to be waiting for a reaction from their South Korean counterparts - something between confrontation and engagement. An article in the Chosun Ilbo reported as follows. North Korean officials said, “The responsibility rests with South Korean authorities who have denied the June 15 Joint Declaration and the October 4 Declaration and pursued confrontation between North and South.” The June 15 and October 4 declarations refer to the two summit agreements reached by Lee’s predecessors, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun.

Mounting pressure from the North has prompted a crackdown on these activists
by South Korea’s Unification Ministry, National Intelligence Service, National Police Agency, and Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry. Unification Ministry spokesman Kim Ho-youn stated in an interview with the Chosun Ilbo on November 20, 2008, the government “reconfirmed” the position that the leaflets were “undesirable” and that civic organizations “must restrain themselves because the practice has a negative effect on inter-Korean relations.”

However, without any harsh consequences from the government, after only one month of voluntary suspension, South Korean CSOs resumed the leaflet campaign. “Our leaflets tell North Koreans about some basic and private aspects of the life of Kim Jong-il,” Park Sang-hak explained. “You can see it’s effective because of the way North Korea is responding... If we stop, we’d be giving in to their blackmail.” Fighters for Free North Korea, the organization responsible for the leaflets, said it had no plans to halt its operations and planned to send another 100,000 leaflets across the border, with more to follow at a later date.

On January 2, 2009, 24 conservative CSOs gathered in Imjingak Plaza in Gyeonggi Province and sent more than 3,000 leaflets in four separate balloons to North Korea. Civil society organizer Choi Woo-won noted in a telephone interview with the Chosun Ilbo the failure of the Sunshine Policy and demanded for the North Koreans to resolve the Kaesong issue, the death of the South Korean tourist at Mount Kumgang resort, and the fate of South Koreans abducted during the Cold War. (Official estimates are that 540 South Korean prisoners of war are still alive in the North.)

This inherent misunderstanding of each other’s intentions led to the inevitable deterioration of North-South relations. In a country infused with juche ideology, it was particularly difficult for North Korean officials to understand the domestic policy processes of South Korea. North Korean officials assumed that an executive order would terminate protests. The fact that the balloon launch had not been stopped added to frustrations as North Korean officials assumed a lack of action on the part of the South Korean government. North Korean officials were adamant that the balloon campaign be ended. On October 28, 2008, Al Jazeera news reported the following North Korean statement, “We clarify our stand that should the South Korean puppet authorities continue scattering leaflets and conducting a smear campaign with sheer fabrications, our army will take a resolute practical
action as we have already warned.”

North Korean defector Lee Min-bok’s organization, Christian North Korean Coalition, had been actively sending leaflets to North Korea. In an interview with the American Foreign Press, Lee stated, “The reason North Korean authorities are so sensitive about the leaflets ... is that they directly criticize Kim Jong-il and target the area of Hwanghae province where North Korea’s elite military units are concentrated.” He identified three main components crucial to the continuance of the regime: isolation, idolization of its leader as a deity, and nuclear weapons. These leaflets, therefore, threatened these values. Kang Cheol-hwan, former North Korean defector and founder of the organization Democratization of North Korea, told Radio Free Asia that the North Korean government had protested more than twenty-two times to the South Korea government, attesting to their genuine worry that the leaflets were a threat to their regime stability.

The way the Lee administration chose to deal with the balloon campaign was reflective of Lee’s inclinations towards dealing with inter-Korea relations. Clearly deviating from the years of engagement promoted under the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, Lee Myung-bak took on a “get-tough” policy with North Korea when coming into office. Representing a conservative standpoint, he thereby refused to enact stricter regulations to deter the leaflet campaign. Despite the obvious threat to stability on the Korean peninsula, President Lee chose to disengage from the North.

In an interview with Hangyoreh, Jeong Wook-sik, head of the Korean CSO, PeaceNetwork, suggested that the South Korean government would need to fulfill the following criteria in order to restore a harmonious balance in inter-Korea relations: South Korea resumes and completes energy aid to North Korea under the October 3 agreement regardless of the North’s acceptance of the nuclear verification agreement; President Lee expresses his willingness to respect the June 15 and October 4 declarations in his New Year’s message; and South Korea resumes humanitarian aid to the North to prevent food shortages in the DPRK.

However, the Lee administration opted to seek change in the North Korean regime instead of promoting the mutual coexistence that the June 15 and October 4 declarations supported. Accordingly, for the first time ever, President Lee adopted

As President Bush began to steer away from his hardline policies and U.S.-DPRK relations were slowly improving, it was important for inter-Korea relations to improve in tandem. The dissemination of these leaflets continued to hinder the peaceful interaction between the two sides, breeding mistrust and hostility between them. For a government that dealt harshly with the protests of the candlelight vigils, the restraint shown towards these conservative groups despite the consequences of their actions revealed an administration allied with these conservative organizations.

Besides the variance in government response to the these two civil society campaigns, the conservative-led human rights balloon campaign and the progressive-led candlelight vigils reflected the ideological chasms that continue to afflict modern CSOs as well. But was political ideology the only factor at play? Participation levels in the protest seem to offer greater insight into which issue areas hold greater resonance with Korean society as a whole.

In an Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies publication on democratic consolidation in South Korea, Stephen Linton, founder and chairman of the Eugene Bell Foundation, characterizes South Korean society as a “disconnected society.” He points out that “people are increasingly disconnected from their past. ... Progress has brought with it a fast-paced urban lifestyle that has little tangible connection to history.” Linton describes a transformation in South Korean attitudes towards North Korea, gradually moving from fear to curiosity and finally to condescension throughout the years. Instead of feeling a sense of kinship, the younger South Korean generation now sees North Koreans as the “country cousins” badly in need of a loan. Unification has thus shifted from an issue of necessity to a liability. The gradual alienation of North Korea may help explain why the balloon campaign did not rally as many South Koreans to the issue.

At the same time, the beef issue was a time to air grievances against the policies of
the Lee government. While the potential for eating contaminated beef was an issue that affected society as a whole, the issue of human rights in North Korea seemed more removed and the sense of urgency was not as apparent.

VII. CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE COMING YEARS

In comparison to 2007, stark differences between civil society’s interaction with the different administrations of Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak emerged in 2008. Under the Roh administration, civil society was able to engage quite closely with the government. There were major government hearings in which CSOs were given the opportunity to voice their opinions on policy issues within committees. Many of their suggestions were then taken into account in government decisions. However, the Lee administration lacked channels of communication between the government and the civil society. Additionally, the Lee government subsequently instigated several policies in order to suppress radical progressive organizations, including the persecution of private corporations that fund NGOs as well as the blocking of internet forums and shutting down of critical websites so that citizens were unable to access or be influenced by these forums.

Despite these measures, Park Soon-sung, director of the Institute of Peace and Disarmament, notes that although the current administration has proven itself to be extremely conservative, it does not indicate a reversion to the type of conditions that sparked protests in the 1980s. Instead, he points to the growth and establishment of various CSOs. He also believes that within the Grand National Party (from which President Lee hails) there are those who believe strongly in liberal democracy. Finally, Park expressed his belief that South Koreans will not tolerate deprivation of their democratic rights. Just as U.S. citizens in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks were willing to give up some freedoms in exchange for greater security, South Korea’s current financial crisis and deteriorating cross-border relations with a nuclear North Korea have created a temporary lull in citizens’ desire for progressive democracy. However, in his opinion, South Korean citizens will only allow for such incursions of their rights until the state of the nation improves.
At the close of 2008, it is evident that many CSOs have mastered some challenges yet are faced with new ones yet to be conquered. The internet has emerged as a new public space in which members of a rapidly disconnected society may regain their status as watchdogs and counter aspects of state power over citizens. It has also become a tool for CSOs to rally participants and to gauge and meet public demands. The challenge then becomes the administration’s ability to allow civil society’s self-expression while still maintaining control over its citizens and order within the nation. As the Lee administration continues on its five year course, the need to efficiently harness the power of the new “public sphere” becomes increasingly apparent.

**CHRONOLOGY 2008**

**Candlelight Vigils**

*April 18*  
The Lee Myung-bak administration agrees to reopen market for U.S. beef.

*May 2-6*  
Small candlelight vigils are organized in protest of U.S. beef. People’s Conference against Mad Cow Disease is formed.

*May 26*  
Beef protests begin in earnest.

*May 31*  
100,000 Koreans participate in candlelight vigils in protest against beef imports.

*June 3*  
Age limit is set on U.S. beef eligible for import.

*June 13*  
Lee Myung-bak’s cabinet offers to resign due to candlelight vigils.

*June 25*  
The United States and South Korea strike a deal on beef sales.
**North Korean Leaflet Campaign**

*September*  
Leaflets are sent in several batches.

*October 2*  
First North-South military meeting since Lee came to office takes place. North Korea protests the leaflet campaign.

*October 27*  
During military-level meetings, North Korean officials demand a stop to the leaflets.

*November 25*  
North Korea provides an ultimatum for the South to stop leaflet distributions and agree to the June 15 and October 4 declarations made with Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun.

*December 5*  
A news conference was held after conservative groups meet with GNP representative Park Hui-tae. Park asked the groups to refrain from sending leaflets.

*December 26*  
Activists decide to resume sending leaflets in January.